Ignore Hash Mismatches with Secure Boot Disabled #58
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Reference: raito/lanzaboote#58
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When lanzaboote doesn't find kernels/initrds that match its hashes, it will decline to boot them regardless of the Secure Boot setup. In combination with #56 and manually signing of initrds/kernels this can easily result in an unbootable system.
Lanzaboot should ignore hashes when Secure Boot is not enabled to give users a good recovery path that doesn't involve booting into a recovery system.
Implementation idea: try to LoadImage a dummy and catch the security violation?
I think this can be very elegantly implemented by using LoadImage on the Linux kernel. We will not sign it after the PE loading PR (#75) goes through. So we can use it to detect Secure Boot.